Disorganization and Financial Collapse by Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika
Disorganization and Financial Collapse
Dalia Marin
Monika Schnitzer
This version: October 1999
 University of Munich, Department of Economics, Ludwigstr. 28 Vgb, D-80539 Mu-
nich, Germany, and Centre for Economic Policy Research. Phone: +49 89 2180
2446, Fax: +49 89 2180 6227, e-mail: Dalia.Marin@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
 University of Munich, Department of Economics, Akademiestr. 1/III, D-80799 Mu-
nich, Germany, and Centre for Economic Policy Research. Phone: +49 89 2180
2217, Fax: +49 89 2180 2767, e-mail: schnitzer@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
This paper has been presented at the Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics: The Eco-
nomics of Transition, September 1999, Stockholm, at the University of Maryland, Univer-
sity of Basle, at the International Monetary Fund, at the 4th Annual International Con-
ference on Transition Economics, Beijing, 1999, at the European Economic Association
Meeting in Santiago de Compostela, September 1999, and at the Verein fr Socialpolitik
in Mainz, October 1999. We would like to thank Daniel Kaufmann, Rachel Kranton,
Holger Mller, Gerard Roland and the discussants and participants of the seminars and
conferences for helpful comments, the Harvard Institute for International Development
for nancial and logistic support, Alexis Giesen and Bogdan Gorochowskij for valuable
research assistance.
Disorganization and Financial Collapse
This version: October 1999
Abstract
Recently, Blanchard and Kremer (BK) argued that disorganization has led to the out-
put decline in the former Soviet Union. In this paper we introduce liquidity and credit
constraints into the BK model and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up
problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage which allows to deal with dis-
organization when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. The theory helps to explain
how the three observed phenomena of output decline, inter-rm arrears and barter in
transition economies are connected. Based on a survey of 165 barter deals in the Ukraine
in 1997, we reproduce the BK result with rm level and deal specic data and we show
that in addition to the input shortage the nancial shortage and barter have each an
important eect on output growth.
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1 Introduction
There are three dominant features which distinguish the development of the countries of
the former Soviet Union from those of the early Transition Economies (TE) like Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic.
1. The decline in output has been much more pronounced in the former Soviet Union
as compared to the early TE. In Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, GDP for 1997 is
estimated to stand at roughly half of its 1989 level.1
2. Inter-rm arrears are much larger and growing much faster in the Republics of the
former Soviet Union as compared to the early TE (Rostowski, 1993).
3. Barter trade has become an important phenomenon in the domestic economy in
Russia, Ukraine, Kasachstan, and Romania, while being absent in Central Europe.
According to a recent survey in Russia, barter accounts for 60 percent of the eco-
nomic activity in 1998. Our survey in the Ukraine gives an estimate of barter of 51
percent of total industrial sales in 1997.2
These developments raise the question whether there is a connection between these three
observations. More specically, what is the relationship between the output decline and
the inter-rm arrears on the one hand and inter-rm arrears and barter on the other?
Has the presence of barter in the former Soviet Union and its absence in Central Europe
something to do with the fact that inter-rm arrears are much larger and output declined
much more sharply in the former Soviet Union?
In this paper we explore these questions based on a model which combines two
arguments given in the transition literature for the output decline in transition economies.
In a recent paper Blanchard and Kremer (BK) (1997) argue that the large decline in
output in the former Soviet Union has been caused by \disorganization" and hold-up
problems. Disorganization arises when old relationships break down before new ones can
be established. In such a \no future" environment a typical mechanism to constrain
1See Transition Report 1998, Table 3.1, p. 50.
2See Commander and Mummsen (1998) for Russia and Marin, Kaufmann and Gorochowskij (1999)
for the Ukraine.
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opportunistic behavior such as reputation does not work. Specicity in the relations
between rms together with incompleteness of contracts results in disorganization in which
intermediate producers in a chain of production refuse to deliver inputs which in turn leads
to the collapse of output.3
Calvo and Coricelli (1995a,b) in turn have argued that the output losses in the early
Transition Economies like Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have been caused by
a lack of credit. They suggest that inter-rm arrears in the early Transition Economies
have been a response to the liquidity squeeze in the economy. Due to the lack of bank
credits rms turn to trade credits from other rms to alleviate the nancial squeeze.
In this paper, we combine the input shortage explanation of BK with the nancial
shortage explanation of Calvo and Coricelli to show that when both problems are present
one can help with the other, rather than making things worse. More specically, we
introduce liquidity and credit constraints into the BK model and show how the credit
constraint can alleviate the hold-up problem. The fact that the input seller has to make
sure to get paid when the input purchaser is short of cash to pay for these inputs gives the
input purchaser bargaining power. This bargaining power in turn reduces the possibility
that the input supplier can exploit the input purchaser's need for the input. Our result
that the lack of cash can alleviate the hold-up problem stands in contrast to BK's model
who, if at all, see a positive role of cash as a commitment device to solve the coordination
problem of rms.
We argue further that barter - a payment in goods rather than money - introduces a
hostage, a commitment device which ensures debt repayment when credit enforcement is
prohibitively costly, and by doing so it provides a mechanism to deal with disorganization
when rms' creditworthiness problem is severe. This argument draws on ideas presented
in earlier work on international countertrade by Marin and Schnitzer (1995,1997), in
which we show that international barter can be seen as an eÆcient institution to solve
moral hazard problems which arise in the technology transfer to developing countries and
in international trade which highly indebted countries. The contribution of the present
paper is to point to the potential importance of the institution of barter in the context
of transition. Barter trade is an inter-rm credit which is repaid in goods rather than
3A similar argument is made by Roland and Verdier (1999). In their model, output may fall because
of market imperfections due to search frictions and Williamsonian relationship specic investments.
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money. Because goods are less anonymous than money, a claim on goods is easier to
enforce than a claim on cash. Thus, barter can be used to collateralize a trade credit when
rms' creditworthiness problem is severe and allows to nance business activities which
otherwise would not take place. Through this credit channel barter helps to smoothen
the output decline and thus prevents output from falling even further.4
Our theory helps to explain how the three observed phenomena of output decline,
inter-rm arrears and barter, are connected. Based on a survey of 165 barter deals among
rms in the Ukraine in 1997, we empirically reproduce the BK result with rm level data,
and we show that in addition to the input shortage the nancial shortage and barter have
each an important eect on output growth. Finally, we show with deal-specic data how
disorganization and the nancial shortage aect the terms of trade in barter deals.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a chain of productionmodel
with credit constraints along the lines of BK (1997) and derive the conditions under which
the credit constraint prevents the output from declining in the presence of the hold-up
problem. In section 3, we show that barter helps to maintain production when the credit
problem becomes so severe that the input supplier refuses to deliver the input. In sections
4 and 5 we test the predictions of the model with rm and deal specic data of 165 barter
deals which we have collected in the Ukraine in 1997. Section 6 concludes.
2 A chain of production with liquidity constraints
In this section we develop a chain of production model in the spirit of Blanchard and
Kremer (1997). Similar to BK, we consider a good which requires n steps of production.
Each production step is carried out by a dierent rm. One unit of the input good gives,
after n steps of production, one unit of the nal good. Each buyer along the chain can
negotiate only with his supplier. This leads to n bargaining problems along the chain. We
assume Nash bargaining at each step with both parties equally sharing the joint surplus,
whenever possible. The value of the nal good is denoted by v > 0. Intermediate goods
j produced at production step j = 1; :::; n  1 have a value of vj  v if sold as input good
for the next production step but they have a value of zero if sold to someone outside the
4For a survey of other explanations of barter in the former Soviet Union and their empirical validity
see Marin, Kaufmann and Gorochowskij (1999).
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production chain. Within the production chain, the value of intermediate good j, vj , is
determined by the payment its producer Bj receives when selling it to the next producer
along the chain of production, Bj+1.
Bargaining at each production step
We now look at the production steps in more detail. Consider the parties involved
in the rst step of production, the supplier of the original input good, S1, and the buyer,
B1. BK formulate the hold-up problem by assuming that S1 cannot sign a contract with
B1 before he has produced the input. S1 must rst produce and only then - when the cost
of producing is sunk - can bargain over the input price. In contrast to BK we consider
a situation in which the supplier holds up the buyer rather than the other way round.
We assume that B1 needs to make a relationship specic investment i at date 0.9. This
investment could be thought of as the time and money B1 spends in order to nd an
adequate supplier and establish a business relationship. This formulation of the hold-up
problem on the buyer's rather than the supplier's side seems to us to be more plausible in
the context of the former Soviet Union, since input suppliers are on the short side of the
market. Thus, it is the input buyer who has to spend time in order to nd an adequate
supplier.5 The problem is that at the time of this investment, the two rms cannot write
a contract which commits S1 to deliver the input good for a particular price in the future.
This leads to a hold up problem in the bargaining of the price when the input good is
actually delivered.
At date 1, the two parties can negotiate about the delivery of S1's input good and
about the price. To save on notation we normalize S1's opportunity cost of delivering the
input to zero and we assume that S1 delivers the input only if he expects a strictly positive
surplus from the transaction. As specied above, v1 denotes the value of the input good
to B1. This value is determined by the future bargainings and solved recursively below.
In contrast to BK, we assume that B1 cannot pay cash at the time of delivery because
he is liquidity constrained. This assumption reects a common problem in transition
economies. In many countries of the former Soviet Union the liquidity squeeze has led to
5In section 5 we provide empirical evidence which supports the assumption that the hold-up problem
is in fact on the buyer's side.
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the phenomenon of inter-rm arrears which accounts for more than 20 percent of GDP in
Russia in 1997 (see for example Transition Report 1997, p.26).6 Thus, S1 has to deliver
the input good on a credit basis, if at all. B1 will be able to pay when he is paid v1 by the
next buyer in the second production step. But of course, enforcing credit repayment in
transition economies is notoriously diÆcult. We capture this notion by assuming that S1
has to incur some (arbitrarily high) cost x(p) to enforce repayment of p. This cost could
be thought of as the cost of using the legal system, including lawyer fees and potentially
bribes for judges or public authorities or the cost of private enforcement, including the
use of Maa etc. These costs are higher the less developed the legal system and the more
indebted B1. We assume for simplicity xed enforcement cost x(p1)  x.
7
If S1 has decided to deliver the input good at date 1, B1 can try to exploit the fact
that credit enforcement is costly and default on some of his payment at date 1.1. Let ~p1
denote the price paid by B1 at this date. Figure 1 summarizes the time sequence of the
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input good delivered




0:9 1 1:1 t
Figure 1: Time sequence at production step 1
This rst production step is repeated at steps 2 to n, with good 1 being used as an
input good sold by B1 (now called S2) to B2, and so on. Note that buyers B2 up to Bn
may have to undertake a similar relationship specic investment ij , j = 2; :::; n, and may
be similarly credit constrained as B1. For notational convenience we restrict attention to
investment levels ij , j = 2; :::; n, such that ij  i for all subsequent buyers. Similarly, the
6BK themselves report evidence based on a survey of 500 rms in Russia that the nancial constraint
was the most important shortage experienced by enterprises (see their Table IV). Between 1993 and 1995
over 60 percent of the rms experienced a shortage of nancial resources compared with only over 20
percent of rms experiencing a shortage of materials.
7This allows us to solve the bargaining problem in each step of the production by simple analogy. It
is straightforward to extend our analysis to enforcement costs that are increasing in the payment to be
enforced. In this case, the problem of creditworthiness becomes more severe at later production steps
which makes it more diÆcult to guarantee S1's participation in the deal earlier on.
5
enforcement costs x are the same in all production steps (see Footnote 7 above).
When production is nished after n steps and the value of the nal good is realized,
Bn can use the revenues from selling this good to pay ~pn 1, the price he actually pays
after delivery of the intermediate good n  1. Similarly, when Sn is paid, he can use his
revenues for paying Sn 1 and so on. We assume that the maximum payment that can be
enforced at each production step j is equal to the revenues vj generated from selling the
good to the next production step.8
The credit problem and contract enforcement
Let us now solve production step 1 recursively, taking as given the value of the good
to be produced at this step, v1. Recall that at date 1, when S1 delivers the input good, B1
has no cash to pay for the input. At date 1.1, when realizing his prots from selling the
input to the next buyer, B1 has enough cash to pay but if he does not do so voluntarily
S1's has to incur costs x if he wants to enforce payment of p1. Suppose B1 refuses to pay
the full price p1 on which the two parties agreed at date 1, but oers to pay ~p1 = p1   x
instead. If this happens, S1 can either accept this payment or enforce p1 at cost x. In
equilibrium he will accept B1's reduced payment.
At date 1, the two parties have to agree on a price p1. Since B1's investment i is
already sunk at this date, this investment is not taken into account in the bargaining.
This is what constitutes the hold-up problem of buyer B1. However, the two parties
anticipate at date 1 that B1 will exploit his position after delivery of the input good and
pay a reduced price at date 1.1. Recall that we have assumed Nash bargaining whenever
possible. This implies that a price p1 is chosen such that




i.e., in anticipating B1's future price reduction, S1 marks up p1 in the rst place, if this
is possible.
8Bj might be involved in other production chains with revenues v0j . But we assume that Sj has
no knowledge about Bj 's revenues outside this particular production chain and thus cannot use those
revenues to enforce payment. Note, however, that this is without loss of generality. Allowing for higher
enforceable payments leads only to level eects but does not aect the qualitative results of our model,
as long as the maximum enforceable payment is nite.
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However, inating the input price in anticipation of the price reduction at date 1.1
will not always be possible. B1's liquidity constraint - the cash he gets when he himself
sells the good to the next buyer, i.e. v1 - puts a bound on the maximum payment that
can be enforced at cost x. Thus, in order to fully capture the subsequent price reduction
S1 may want to inate the price more than can credibly be enforced as payment at date





+ x; v1] (2)
Only if enforcement costs are low, i.e. x < v1=2, will S1 be able to pass on x in the price
mark-up. In this case, the fact that B1 is liquidity constrained does not prevent S1's and
B1's equally sharing the surplus, v1. If x is suÆciently large, i.e. x > v1=2, B1's liquidity
constraint will make it impossible for S1 to pass on these costs to him. B1's cash from
the sale to the next buyer will simply not be enough to fully cover these costs. In this
case, B1 can exploit the fact that he is liquidity constrained to capture more than half of
the surplus. If the enforcement cost excede the total value of the transaction, i.e. x  v1,
then B1 captures the entire surplus and S1 cannot guarantee himself a positive payo.
The following payo functions summarize these three cases. If S1 delivers the input good,






  i if x  v1
2
x  i  v12   i if
v1
2  x  v1
v1   i if x > v1
(3)






if x < v1
2





 x  v1
0 if x > v1
(4)
Thus, B1's liquidity constraint gives him some bargaining advantage because credit
enforcement is not costless to S1 and the maximum payment that can be enforced is
nite. If credit enforcement is a suÆciently severe problem, B1 can use his bargaining
power to shift the surplus in his favor. Otherwise, the bargaining is either not aected by
the presence of enforcement costs (when x is low) or S1 refuses to participate in the deal
(when x is very large).
So far we have taken the value of the rst production step, v1, as given. We still
have to determine how v1 is aected by the value of the nal product, v, by the number
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of production stepts, n, and by the fact that all buyers are liquidity constrained and that
credit enforcement is costly. For this purpose, we have to solve the game recursively. The
following Lemma characterizes v1 as a function of v, n and x.
Lemma 1 The value of production at step 1 is
v1(x; n; v) =
v
2n 1 if x <
v
2n 1
v1(x; n; v) <
v
2n 1




The important thing to note here is that if x is small enough it does not aect the
value of production at step 1. The reason is that in all subsequent production steps x can
be fully covered by a price mark-up and hence does not aect the equal sharing of the
surplus.
Disorganization, nancial constraint and output fall
We can now state the conditions under which production takes place at the rst and
all subsequent production steps. S1 agrees to deliver the input good at date 1 on a credit
basis if and only if 1S > 0. This is the case if and only if
v
2n 1
> x ; (6)
because in this case v1 = v=2
n 1 by Lemma 1 and x < v1, so that 
1
S = v1   x > 0 (see
equation (4)). If x  v=2n 1 instead, then v1 < v=2n 1 and hence x > v1, so that 1S = 0
(see equation (4)).
At date 0, B1 is willing to engage in the up-front investment i if and only if (6) is





Note that B1's payo is v=2
n   i if x < v=2n, following from Lemma 1 and equation (3),
and it is x   i if v=2n < x < v=2n 1.
The following proposition states under which conditions production will take place
in the presence of both the hold-up problem and the credit problem.
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Proposition 1 (i) Suppose there exists a hold-up problem, but no credit problem, i.e.




(ii) Suppose there exists a credit problem but no hold-up problem, i.e. i = 0 and x > 0.




(iii) Suppose there exist both a hold-up problem and a credit problem, i.e. i > 0 and
x > 0.
{ If x  v
2n




{ If v2n < x <
v
2n 1 then production takes place if and only if
x  i (11)
{ If v
2n 1
< x then no production takes place.
Proof: See Appendix
The rst part of this proposition restates the BK result which says that production
will take place when B1's share of the value of production suÆces to cover B1's investment
costs. Thus, the larger the number of production steps n, the smaller B1's share of the
value of production and thus the more severe the hold-up problem. The second part of
the proposition makes Calvo and Coricelli's point that production might not take place
due to the lack of credit even in the absence of the hold-up problem. Output collapses
when S1's share of the value of production does not suÆce to cover S1's enforcement costs.
Thus, the larger the number of production steps n, the smaller S1's share of the value of
production and thus the less attractive it is for S1 to grant a credit to B1.
The last part of the proposition is particularly interesting. It shows that the presence









Without a liquidity constraint and enforcement costs, B1's payo would be v=2
n, i.e. half
the value of production at the rst production step, and if i > v=2n then no production
would take place at all. However, if enforcement costs are suÆciently high, B1 can exploit
this fact to capture more than one half of the production value. B1's ex-post bargaining
power has to be suÆciently large to cover his ex-ante investment; i.e. i  x in order for
production to take place. Since S1 needs a positive payo, enforcement costs may not be
too high, either; i.e. x < v=2n 1. Thus, production takes place if i  x < v=2n 1.
3 Creating a hostage
As we have seen, S1 may not be willing to deliver the input good if the credit problem is too
severe, i.e. if x  v=2n 1. Thus, if the buyer has no cash and the legal system to enforce
payment is poorly developed a potentially valuable transaction does not take place. In
this section we investigate to what extent barter can help under these circumstances. We
will show that barter can be used as a hostage, i.e. as a commitment device that prevents
the buyer from fully exploiting his bargaining power due to the enforcement cost. In this
sense barter creates a deal-specic collateral that helps to alleviate the hold-up problem
when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly.9
Suppose B1 can produce one unit of a barter good, but only after date 1.
10 Let w
denote the value of the barter good and let k denote B1's production cost. If B1 sells this
barter good to someone outside the production chain he does so at a cash price pCB =
w+k
2 ,
assuming again Nash bargaining. This would give B1 a payo of (w  k)=2. However, B1
can also use this barter good as a hostage to improve his creditworthiness. In this case,
B1 promises to deliver the barter good to S1 when credit repayment is due. The price for
this barter good, pB, is xed together with p1 before S1 decides about his input delivery.
Of course, given that the two parties engage in Nash bargaining whenever possible
they negotiate prices p1 and pB such that they split the surplus of both transactions
9There is a related literature on barter in market economies which oers a dierent type of reasons
for non-monetary trade. Prendergast and Stole (1997) consider barter as a way of segmenting the market
on the basis of buyers ability to pay and Ellingson (1998) sees barter as a mechanism to reveal credibly
that the debtor has no cash.
10If B1 could deliver the barter good right away he would not be liquidity constrained because he could
use the barter good as payment in kind.
10
equally, taking into account the renegotiation on p1 at date 1.1. This means that p1 and
pB have to be xed such that
(p1   x) + w   pB = v1   (p1   x) + pB   k (13)
where the left hand side represents S1's payo and the right hand side B1's payo from

















is the price for the barter good in a cash transaction, as argued above.
Recall that the price p1 that can be enforced is bounded above by v1. Thus, for x > v1=2,
i.e. when enforcement cost prevent an equal split of the surplus in the input trade, an
increase in x must be compensated by a reduction in (w + k)=2   pB to induce the Nash
bargaining solution. What this eectively means is that the inclusion of the barter trade
allows B1 to shift some of the prot back to S1 by discounting the price of the barter
good pB by an amount of p
C
B   pB.
Note, however, that pB cannot be chosen arbitrarily small because B1 cannot be
forced to deliver the barter good as promised, but has to be induced to do so voluntarily.
If B1 cheats on S1 and refuses to deliver, all S1 can do, given that B1 has signed a contract
that promises delivery of the barter good, is to try to prevent a sale of the barter good to
someone else. We assume that S1 succeeds with such an attempt with probability (1 )
which reduces B1's potential payo from selling the barter good to 
w k
2
, where   1.
This implies that B1 voluntarily delivers the barter good if and only if




i.e. his payo from delivering the barter good to S1 must be at least as high as his payo
from trying to sell it to someone else.









 z ; (16)
i.e., B1 will discount the price for the barter good by an amount which equals at most
what S1 can take away from him due to the fact that B1 has signed the barter contract.
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Using (16) in (14) we see that this constraint puts a lower bound on the mark-up for price




+ x   z : (17)
We can interprete z as the commitment value or hostage created by the barter contract.
The larger this value z, the less the credit enforcement cost negatively aects S1's will-
ingness to participate in this input deal.
Considering now B1's decision at date 0, under what conditions will he be willing
to make investment i in the relationship with S1? Note that the alternative to investing
i and carry out both the production of good 1 and the barter good is to produce only
the barter good and sell it for price pCB = (w + k)=2. This implies B1 will undertake the
investment if and only if the prices pB and p1 chosen at date 1 are such that




The following proposition characterizes how barter aects the production decision.
Proposition 2 Suppose there exists a hold-up problem and a credit problem. Suppose










< x   z < v
2n 1
then production takes place if and only if
x   z  i (20)
- If v
2n 1
< x   z then no production takes place.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note rst that the size of the hostage z created by barter depends on two things.
First, it depends on the value of the good oered as a means of payment in barter.
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When sold on the market outside of barter, this value is (w   k)=2 for the buyer (always
assuming Nash bargaining). Second, the size of z depends on B1's payo when signing
the barter contract and defaulting on payment which is expressed by (w   k)=2. The
dierence between these two payos is determined by the parameter  and captures the
commitment value which B1 achieves by agreeing to repay the trade credit with goods
rather than cash. By doing so B1 reduces his chances to sell the barter good to someone
else than S1. (1 ) is the probability of being caught when B1 cheats on repayment and
sells the barter good to someone else than S1. The parameter  can be thought of as a
measure of how well the input seller can label the barter good as belonging to him. The
smaller , the less \anonymous" the barter good and the smaller B1's cheating surplus
from defaulting on payment. Thus, the smaller , the larger the commitment value of
barter and the larger the hostage z.11 B1 uses the barter contract as a commitment to
give S1 more than half of the value of the barter transaction, as a compensation for the
fact that S1's payo in the input transaction is too low due to credit enforcement cost.
As a consequence, barter reduces the creditworthiness problem caused by the enforcement
costs x. This is reected in the proposition by a shift of the parameter range for which
the input transaction takes place. The benchmark is no longer x but x   z.
4 Evidence on output decline from rm level data
In this section we explore the predictions from our model with data of 165 barter deals
in the Ukraine in 1997.
The Appendix shows summary statistics of the variables used. We interviewed 55
rms to obtain information on 165 barter deals. Each rm provided us with 3 barter
deals. Each barter deal involved 2 rms, the seller and the buyer. Many of the rms were
well informed about the nancial and economic conditions of the rms they traded with
because they served as nanciers. This is why we could obtain data on more than the 55
11See Marin and Schnitzer (1997) who discuss the property of anonymity of the barter good in the
context of a theory of money. Note that the mechanism by which a hostage is created here diers from the
one described in Marin and Schnitzer (1995). Here a hostage to control the credit enforcement problem is
created when the buyer agrees to repay the loan in goods rather than money. There a hostage to control
the technology transfer problem is created when the technology buyer in the developing country has not
enough cash in his pocket and thus is unable to produce the good when the seller in the industrial country
oers inferior technology.
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interviewed rms. Thus, depending on the variable, the rm information in our sample
varies between 69 and 160 observations.
Our model implies, similar to BK that rms with more complex production will
experience a more pronounced output loss. This can be seen by considering conditions (8),
(10) and (11). The model implies further that the output decline will be less pronounced
for rms short of cash. If rms are short of cash, they can use the credit constraint in
the bargaining to prevent to be held up by the input supplier. However, if the nancial
constraint becomes too large it may be too costly for the supplier to enforce payment and
thus he may not be willing to deliver the input good. The condition for the credit problem
to alleviate the hold-problem given in equation (12) states that credit enforcement costs
have to be just right. They have to be suÆciently high to give the input purchaser
suÆcient bargaining power to allow him to cover his ex-ante investment, but they may
not be too high, otherwise the input supplier will refuse to participate in the deal. Thus,
we expect an inversely U-shaped relationship between nancial constraints and output
growth.
The model implies also that the nancial constraint should be less binding for bar-
tering rms. Again, we expect an inversely U-shaped relationship between barter and
output. If the nancial constraint is too severe for the input supplier to participate in the
deal, barter contributes to maintaining production by relaxing this constraint. However,
when the barter exposure becomes large it might reduce the credit problem by so much
that the input purchaser fails to be eective in capturing some of the rents from the input
supplier and thus may not prevent the input purchaser from being held up.12
In Table 1 we take a rst look at the relationship between the output growth of the
rm, the liquidity squeeze and barter. We ask the question whether rms with large rm
arrears, total arrears and with a big exposure to barter did relatively better in terms of
output growth as compared to the economy as a whole. We take arrears as evidence that
the rm faced a liquidity constraint and therefore turned to other rms for credit.13
12Note that this empirical prediction also holds if barter does not involve a credit relationship but if
the goods used as payment are available right away.
13Marin, Kaufmann and Gorochowskij (1999) provide evidence that arrears can indeed be taken as a
measure for the credit constraint. They show that inter-enterprise credit is negatively associated with
bank credit for private rms. They infer from this negative association between these two types of credit
that inter-rm credit cushioned the liquidity contraction induced by lower bank credit. For another
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Insert Table 1 here
We measure the relative growth performance of the rm by the mean percentage de-
viation of the output growth of the rm between 1994 and 1996 relative to GDP growth
in the Ukraine in the same period. The table shows that the rms of our sample experi-
enced the same growth rate as GDP of the Ukraine economy. However, rms with total
arrears of more than 25 percent of output did substantially better in terms of output than
rms with total arrears of less than 25 percent. When total arrears are decomposed into
tax, wage and rm arrears, a slightly dierent picture emerges for wage and rm arrears.
When wage and rm arrears become very large (over 9 percent and over 50 percent of
output, respectively) then the rm's output performance becomes worse than that of the
economy as a whole.
A similar picture emerges for the rm's barter exposure. Firms with a barter share
of output over 70 percent did less well and those with a barter share of over 30 percent
performed better compared to the economy as a whole. The data seem to conrm the
inversely U-shaped behavior between output growth on the one hand and rm arrears
and barter on the other.
In order to explore this relationship in more detail we regressed the relative output
growth of the rm on BK's index of complexity, total arrears, and the barter share of the
rm. The results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports the result of a regression that
includes only BK's index of complexity. BK use the complexity variable as a measure
for the severity of the hold-up problem. Complexity is an index that takes the value of
zero if the sector uses only one input and approaches one when the sector uses several
inputs from other sectors. We matched the ISIC sector of our bartering rms with the
sector of the complexity index given by BK. The measure of complexity is constructed on
the basis of the 1990 \100-sector" input-output table for Russia. We use this variable for
the Ukraine, since both economies have very similar input-ouput structures. The ISIC
classication of our sample could not always be perfectly matched with BK's classication
of the index which might have introduced some noise into the complexity measure.
explanation of arrears in Russia see Rostowski (1993).
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Insert Table 2 here
The variable is negative and highly signicant, which conrms BK's results.14 How-
ever, as equations (8) and (9) of Proposition 1 show, the degree of complexity (the number
of production steps n) worsens both the hold-up problem as well as the credit problem.
Thus, the estimated eect of complexity on output growth might be due to the fact that
rms are short of cash and face a credit constraint rather than due to the fact that they
have no trust in their business partners. In order to distinguish between the two problems
we introduce total arrears of the rm into the equation as a proxy for the rm's credit
constraint (column 2-6).15 Arrears can be seen as a proxy for the credit enforcement costs
x which increase with the rm's indebtedness. As expected, the arrears variable has a
positive sign and is highly signicant. The positive sign suggests that indeed the credit
constraint enables the rm to deal with specicity.
Next, we include the rms' barter share into the equation (column 4). The variable
turns out to have a negative and signicant eect on output growth. We also include a
quadratic term of the barter share into the equation to capture the inversely U-shaped
relationship between output growth and barter which is signicant and positive.
In order to look at the inversely U-shaped relationship between arrears and barter
on the one hand and output growth on the other in more detail, we divided the data into
the following subsamples: high barter rms with a barter share of over 70 percent, low
barter rms with a barter share of less than 30 percent, and high debt rms with total
arrears of more than 40 percent of output. We also look at those rms in the sample which
performed better than the economy as a whole. Consider rst the results for the two barter
subsamples which are given in columns 7 to 14 of Table 2. The regressions indeed give a
positive eect of barter on output growth for low barter rms and a negative one for high
barter rms. It is interesting to note that for the sample of low barter rms the inclusion
of the arrears variable in the equation reduces the estimated eect of complexity on output
substantially and the eect becomes insignicant at conventional levels. Apparently, for
14Note that Konings and Walsh (1999) instead nd that disorganization did not constrain employment
and productivity growth in newly established private rms in the Ukraine.
15Ickes and Ryterman (1993) also see arrears in Russia as a response to a liquidity shortage in the
economy.
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these rms the complexity variable seems to be capturing more of a nancial shortage
than that of an input shortage.
Consider next the results for the sample of high arrears rms given in columns 15
to 18. For highly indebted rms arrears do not appear to play a role for output growth.
These rms appear to have too large credit enforcement costs to make it worthwhile for
the input supplier to participate in the deal. Moreover, these rms seem to be so little
creditworthy that even barter cannot help them to maintain production by getting trade
credits from other rms.
The results for the sample of high growth rms are given in columns 19 to 22. It
appears that these rms showed a favorable growth performance because they used their
credit constraint and barter activity eectively to avoid an input and nancial shortage.
Finally, we include the share of bank debt in percent of the rm's output in the
output growth regressions given in columns 6, 10, 14, 18, and 22 of Table 2. This is an
alternative way to capture whether or not rms faced a credit contraction problem. The
positive and signicant coeÆcient of the share of bank debt supports Calvo and Coricelli's
view that credit contraction and the associated liquidity shortage have caused the output
decline in Eastern Europe.16
5 Evidence on Specicity and Credit Constraints with
Deal-Specic Data
In this section we turn to the deal specic predictions of our model which we would
like to test. We need to evaluate how the hold-up problem and the credit constraint
specied in the previous sections are reected in the terms of the barter contract. We
have argued above that the hold-up problem can be alleviated if the input buyer faces
a credit constraint and that barter is used if credit enforcement becomes too costly for
16Calvo and Coricelli run a similar regression between output and credit for Poland. They get a point
estimate between 0.2 and 0.6 depending on specication which suggests that a 10 percent contraction
of credit results in an output decline between 2 and 6 percent. Note further that BK report evidence
based on a survey among 500 rms in Russia which suggests that the nancial constraint was the most
important shortage experienced by enterprises (see their Table IV). Between 1993 and 1995 over 60
percent of the rms experienced a shortage of nancial resources compared with only over 20 percent of
the rms experiencing shortages of material.
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the seller. Thus, we expect these problems to be reected in the prices chosen in barter
contracts as compared to the prices in cash deals where no such problems are present.





+ x; v1] : (21)
Compare this price with the usual cash price for the input good with no such problems.
In this case the investment costs i can be contracted on before investment takes place,
and the buyer has no liquidity constraint and thus cannot use it to renegotiate the input
price. Splitting of the surplus implies a cash price pC1













+x; v1] = p1 because the cash price reects the investment cost
i and does not include a mark-up for the credit enforcement cost x.
Similarly, if p1 cannot be increased anymore because it reaches its upper bound v1,
then we expect a discount on pB as compared to the cash price p
C














+ x   (pCB   pB) : (23)
Thus, we expect that the hold-up problem and the credit problem both shift the
terms of trade of the barter contract in favor of the input supplier, either by an increase
of p1 as compared to p
C
1 or by a decrease of pB as compared to p
C
B or both.
Our model predicts further that the price discount on the barter good will be larger
the larger the hostage z, i.e. the smaller  and the larger (w   k)=2, as can be seen in
equations (15) and (16). Thus, the more specic (the smaller ) and the more liquid (the
larger (w   k)=2) the barter good the larger the discount on pB and thus the more shifts
the terms of trade in favour of the input supplier.
To measure the shift of the terms of trade in barter relative to the prices prevalent in
cash transactions we use the variable TOT. TOT is dened as the dierence of SCASH
and PCASH, where SCASH and PCASH are the percentage dierences of barter prices
as compared to cash prices for the input good and the barter good, respectively. Let pC1
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and p1 denote the price for the input good in cash and barter transactions, respectively.
Similarly, let the price for the barter good in cash and in barter transactions be pCB and pB .




1 and the percentage
price change for the barter good is (pB pCB)=p
C
B. The net terms of trade eect is measured
by TOT = SCASH - PCASH.
In order to obtain a proxy for the severity of the hold up problem (a measure for n) on
the input deal we have classied the input good and the barter good of each transaction
according to the complexity index given by BK. With this method we constructed a deal-
specic complexity measure for both goods exchanged, SCOMPLEX and PCOMPLEX.
Furthermore, we use as a proxy for the creditworthiness (as a measure for x) of the
input purchaser her total outstanding debt (rm arrears, wage arrears and tax arrears),
PARREARS. The data allow us to distinguish whether the rm is on the selling or buying
end of the transaction.
Insert Table 3 here
We rst look at the price eect on each of the deals separately and then in a next step
focus on the net eect on the terms of trade of both transactions together. Consider rst
the regression on the percentage price change on the input deal SCASH given in columns 1
to 7 in Table 3. The more complex the input good the more severe is the hold-up problem
in the input deal and thus the larger the barter price p1 relative to the cash price p
C
1 .
Thus we expect a positive sign on the complexity index for the input good SCOMPLEX.
This is supported by the regressions. The input specic complexity measure is positive
and signicant independent of the specication.17
Furthermore, we expect the input purchaser's indebtedness (PARREARS) to have
a positive eect on SCASH, since the input seller will inate the barter input price p1
relative to the cash price pC1 to cover the anticipated credit enforcement costs x. The
17These empirical ndings justify the assumption we made in the model that the hold-up problem
arises on the buyer's rather than on the seller's side. If BK's formulation of the hold-up problem on the
seller's side were valid the input price would be lower rather than higher in barter as compared to cash
deals. Thus, in this case we would have expected a negative rather than a positive coeÆcient on the
complexity index.
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coeÆcient on PARREARS is zero and insignicant suggesting that the input supplier
has not been able to pass on these costs on the input purchaser. Our theory predicts
for this case that the input purchaser will need to shift some of the prot back to the
input supplier in order to make him participate in the deal by discounting the price for
the barter good. Thus, we expect a negative sign on the PARREARS variable in the
regressions for PCASH. Looking at the regression results for the percentage price change
on the barter good PCASH given in columns 8 to 14 this is indeed conrmed by the data.
PARREARS is negative and highly signicant.
Consider next the net terms of trade eect of both transactions given in columns 15
to 22 of Table 3. We expect a positive sign for SCOMPLEX and PARREARS in the TOT
regressions, since a larger SCASH due to the hold-up problem and a smaller PCASH due
to the credit problem imply both a larger TOT. This is indeed the case. The data suggest
then that the hold-up problem is reected in an inated price on the input deal and the
input purchaser's credit problem appears to have been so severe that it had to be taken
care of by price concessions on the barter side of the contract. Both problems have shifted
the terms of trade in favour of the input seller.
We predict two more variables to have aected the terms of the contract: the liquidity
w and the anonymity  of the barter good. The more liquid and the less anonymous the
barter good, the larger the hostage value of barter and thus the larger the discount on
the price of the barter good pB relative to the cash price p
C
B . Thus, we expect a negative
coeÆcient of liquidity and anonymity in the PCASH regressions and a positive coeÆcient
for the same variables in the TOT regressions.
We measure the liquidity and anonymity of the barter good by PCOKE and PCOMPLEX.18
PCOKE is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the barter good is coke or
petroleum. Coke is a liquid good (everybody uses it for heating) which can be sold
easily on the market at a known price. PCOMPLEX measures the complexity of the
barter good. We use it as a proxy for the degree of specicity of the barter good. If the
complexity index for the barter good is large and thus there are many production steps to
get from the raw input to the nal good, we infer that the barter good can be potentially
18For the concept of liquidity in an incentive theory of money see Banerjee and Maskin (1997); see
Marin and Schnitzer (1997) who use the liquidity and anonymity properties of goods to explain the trade
pattern of barter in international trade.
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used only by a small number of rms. The more specic the good is for the creditor's use,
the harder it will be for the debtor to cheat on repayment and to sell the good to someone
else than the creditor. We therefore expect a negative coeÆcient on PCOMPLEX in the
PCASH regressions and a positive coeÆcient in the TOT regressions.
Turning to the results given in Table 3 PCOKE has the wrong sign but is not signif-
icant. PCOMPLEX has the expected sign and is highly signicant in all regressions.
Additionally, we include the variables SSTATE and PDISTORT to control for other
distortions in the economy which might have inuenced the terms of the contract. SSTATE
is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the selling rm is a state owned enterprise.
PDISTORT is a dummy of value one if the market for the barter good is regulated and
thus pCB does not reect market forces. It appears that when the seller is a state enterprise
the input price is discounted and the barter price is inated suggesting that the state rms
subsidized their buyers. In contrast, when the price for the barter good is regulated, then
the contract is used to shift the terms of trade in favour of the seller rather than the
buyer.
Finally, we use the variables REPEAT and RELATION which capture the terms of
the relationship between the input supplier and purchaser. RELATION is a dummy that
takes the value of one if the seller is an energy or other input provider and zero otherwise.
REPEAT is a dummy with the value of one if there is a history in the relationship between
the input seller and the purchaser. RELATION measures the quality of the relationship
and REPEAT the duration of the relationship between the parties. We expect both
variables to have enhanced trust among the parties involved in the deal and thus to have
an impact on the terms of the contract. Both variables are, however, not signicant in
any of the regressions. In times of historic change, reputation does not appear to have
governed the behaviour of the parties.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we establish a link between the output decline, inter-rm arrears, and barter
in the former Soviet Union. We show that inter-rm arrears can be used by rms to avoid
the problems associated with complexity and specicity. The fact that input suppliers
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have to worry about being paid when they extend trade credits to their buyers means that
they cannot exploit their buyers' dependence on these inputs. This way, the presence of
arrears has helped to avoid the output to collapse even more than it actually has in the
former Soviet Union.
However, very large arrears become counterproductive for maintaining production
because credit enforcement becomes very costly and thus input suppliers will refuse to
extend credit to their buyers. Under these circumstances, barter trade is the only way to
maintain production. Barter trade is an inter-rm credit which is repaid in goods rather
than money. Barter creates a hostage which can be used to collateralize a trade credit
when rms' creditworthiness problem is severe. This function of barter explains why rms
are able to give loans to each other when the banking sector is reluctant to provide capital.
Our model is able to explain the pattern of arrears and barter over time and across
transition economies. The arrears crisis started in 1992 - 19993 in Russia, reaching almost
10 percent of GDP (rm and tax arrears) while barter started to rise in 1994. The theory
predicts barter to exist when arrears reach a critical level at which credit enforcement
becomes so costly that rms refuse to extend further trade credits to each other and thus
only barter can maintain production. Our data suggest that arrears reached this crititcal
level at around 30 to 40 percent of rms' sales. Thus, we argue that the explosive increase
of barter in Russia since 1994 (from 5 percent of sales in 1993 to around 60 percent of sales
in 1998) has been triggered by a level of arrears at which production was unsustainable.
Furthermore, the model provides an explanation for why the former Soviet Union
diers from the early transition economies in Central Europe. Disorganization and speci-
city have posed a more severe problem for more insulated economies like the former
Soviet Union, while in open economies like Central Europe entry of foreign rms allevi-
ated the problems of small numbers. This is why the output fall was more pronounced
in the former compared to the latter. In the former Soviet Union other mechanisms than
international trade and foreign direct investment must have been at work to limit the
adverse eect of specicity. We argue in this paper that inter-rm arrears and barter can
be seen as such mechanisms to deal with problems arising in the transition. Inter-rm
arrears are larger and growing faster in the former Soviet Union compared to Central Eu-
rope because of their role to deal with disorganization and hold-up. Barter is observed in
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the former Soviet Union while being absent in Eastern Europe because the arrears crisis
was more severe in the former than the latter region.
Our model has an important implication for the eectiveness of monetary policy in
the former Soviet Union. In Russia's barter economy a monetary expansion has perverse
eects. The reason is that reducing arrears by fusing liquidity into the economy will
eliminate input buyers' bargaining power thereby robbing them of their instrument to
deal with disorganization and the trust problem of the economy. This leads to less rather
than more output. Thus, in a distorted economy like Russia's eliminating one distortion
- arrears through a monetary expansion - without removing the other distortion - the
trust problem in the economy - will not lead to desired outcomes. Monetary policy will
lead either to lower output, because production breaks down due to the hold-up problem,
or to higher ination, because input suppliers will inate their inputs to exploit their
bargaining power when the hold-up problem is not too large. In other words, a monetary
expansion in a barter economy works like introducing partial reform in an overall distorted
economy.19
19For the argument why partial reform might make things worse in an overall distorted economy see
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose that all buyers are liquidity constrained and thus have to delay repayment.
Consider now the nal step of production. This is exactly like the rst step, with the only
exception that Bn does not have to make an up-front investment. Then the two parties
share the joint surplus as follows: Sn receives pn x = v=2 andBn receives v pn+x = v=2,
provided x  v=2. If v=2 < x < v, then Bn receives x and Sn receives v   x. If x  v,
then no production takes place at the nal step. The value of production at step n  1 is
equal to the payo of the seller at the last production step. Solving the game recursively










  x if v
2n j





Note that if x > v
2n j 1
production will not take place at step j+1 because the seller Sj+1
will not be able to guarantee himself a positive payo. Thus, the value of production at
step j is zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Production takes place if and only equations (6) and (7) are satised.
(i) If x = 0, equation (6) is satised by assumption and (7) is satised if and only if
i  v=2n.
(ii) If i = 0, equation (7) is satised by assumption and (6) is satised if and only if
x < v=2n 1.
(iii) Suppose i > 0 and x > 0. If x  v=2n, then (6) is satised by assumption and and
(7) is satised if and only if i  v=2n. If v=2n < x < v=2n 1, then (6) is satised by
assumption and and (7) is satised if and only if i  x. If x > v=2n 1, then (6) is
violated and no production takes place.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Note rst that we can determine the value of v1, just like in Lemma 1, with the only
dierence that now the enforcement cost x are reduced by the hostage z. Of course,
barter needs to take place only at those production steps j, where x > vj=2, i.e. the
liquidity constraint prevents an equal sharing of the surplus at production stage j. With
this in mind, we can solve the game recursively as done in Lemma 1, with the only
dierence that now instead of x we have to consider x   z, whenever x is hitting this
constraint.
Thus, we have v1(x; z) =
v
2n 1
if x   z  v
2n 1
and v1(x; z) <
v
2n 1
if x   z > v
2n 1
.
Recall that p1 and pB are xed such that the parties share the surplus equally when-









+ x  z; v1] : (26)
Note that both S1 and B1 need to be willing to participate and make the necessary
investment. This requires for B1 that




and for S1 it requires




Suppose x   z < v
2n 1
. Then v1 =
v
2n 1



















Note that this is condition (19) in Proposition 2.
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Suppose next that x z < v
2n 1
, so that v1 =
v
2n 1




< x z < v
2n 1
=
v1. Then, using the equations for p1 and pB , (27) requires that
x   z  i (31)




> x   z (32)
Note that this is condition (20) in Proposition 2.
Finally, note that if x  z > v
2n 1
, then v1 <
v
2n 1
and it is not possible to satisfy (28)
so that no production takes place as specied in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
26
References
Banerjee, Abijit and Eric Maskin, \A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996, 111, 955-1005.
Blanchard, Olivier and Michael Kremer, \Disorganization", Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1997, 112, 1091-1126.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Fabrizio Coricelli, \Inter-enterprise Arrears in Economies
in Transition", in Holzmann Robert et al. (eds.): Output Decline in Eastern Eu-
rope, 1995a, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Fabrizio Coricelli, \Output Collapse in Eastern Eu-
rope: The Role of Credit", in M.I. Blejer, Calvo G., Coricelli F. and A. Gelb
(eds.): Eastern Europe in Transition: From Recession to Growth? World Bank
Discussion Paper 196, World Bank, Washington 1995b.
Commander, Simon and Christian Mumssen, \Understanding Barter in Russia"
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998, mimeo, London.
Ellingson, Tore, \Payments in Kind", 1998, mimeo, Stockholm.
Ickes, Barry W. and Randi Ryterman, \Roadblock to Economic Reform: Inter-
Enterprise Debt and the Transition to Markets", Post-Soviet Aairs, 1993, 9,
231-252.
Konings, Jozef and Patrick Paul Walsh, \Disorganization in the Transition Pro-
cess: Firm-level Evidence from Ukraine", Economics of Transition 1999, 7, 29-46.
Marin, Dalia, Kaufmann Daniel and Bogdan Gorochowskij, \Barter in Transi-
tion Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukrainian Data", University
of Munich, The World Bank, Humboldt University Berlin, mimeo, 1999.
Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer, \Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Counter-
trade with Evidence", American Economic Review, 1995, 85, 1047-1064.
Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer, \The Economic Institution of International
Barter", CEPR Discussion Paper No 1658, London, 1997.
Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, \The Transition to
a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1992, 107, 889-906.
Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole, \Barter, liquidity and market segmentation"
1997, mimeo, University of Chicago.
Roland, Gerard and Thierry Verdier, \Transition and the Output Fall", Eco-
nomics of Transition 1999, 7, 1-28.
Rostowski, Jacek, \The Inter-Enterprise Debt Explosion in the Former Soviet Union:
Causes and Consequences, Cures", Center for Economic Performance/ESR Dis-
cussion Paper No 142, 1993.
27
Russian Economic Barometer, Survey of Industrial Firms, Institute for World Econ-
omy and International Relations, Moscow, 1997.
Transition Report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London,
1997.
Transition Report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London,
1998.
28
Denition of Variables and Sample Statistics
Variable Observations Description Mean Min. Max. Std Dev.
arrears 138 share of rm's arrears (tax, wage
and rm arrears) in percent of
output
41.40 1.00 687.90 101.068
parrears 69 total arrears of purchasing rm in
percent of output
65.30 0.00 687.90 157.947
bankdebt 150 rm's bank debt in percent of
output
6.31 0.00 104.20 15.955
tax arrears 150 rm's tax arrears in percent of
output
7.15 0.00 121.50 19.306
wage arrears 150 rm's wage arrears in percent of
output
3.38 0.00 38.60 6.001
rm arrears 138 rm's inter-rm arrears in percent
of output
30.15 0.70 626.00 90.887
relative rm
growth
153 percentage deviation of rm's out-
put growth relative to the growth
rate of GDP between 1994 and 1996
0.01 -2.03 25.43 4.215
barter 165 share of rm's barter in percent of
output
45.21 1.00 100.00 28.181
complexity 141 complexity index of the industrial
sector of the rm; the index is equal
to zero if there is only one input and
tends to one if the sector uses many
inputs.
0.80 0.34 0.92 0.116
scomplex 142 complexity of input good; the index
is equal to zero if there is only one
input and tends to one if input good
is produced with many inputs
0.77 0.30 0.92 0.139
pcomplex 145 complexity of barter good; the in-
dex is equal to zero if there is only
one input and tends to one if barter
good is produced with many inputs.
0.75 0.19 0.92 0.134
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Denition of Variables and Sample Statistics Continued
Variable Observations Description Mean Min. Max. Std Dev.
tot 163 net dierence between cash and
barter price in percent (scash-
pcash)
4.59 -168.00 50.00 18.075
scash 163 dierence between the barter price
and cash price in percent of the cash
price for the input good
3.43 -16.70 49.00 8.302
pcash 163 dierence between the barter price
and cash price in percent of the cash
price for the barter good
-1.16 -50.00 186.00 18.633
sstate 165 dummy variable equal to one if sell-
ing rm is state
owned
D=1, 49 observations
pdistort 165 dummy variable equal to one if mar-
ket for barter good is regulated
D=1, 36 observations
pcoke 148 dummy variable equal to one if
barter good is coke or
petroleum
D=1, 16 observations
relation 164 dummy variable equal to 1 if seller
is input supplier
D=1, 88 observations
repeat 165 dummy variable equal to 1 if
seller and buyer have interacted
frequently
D=1, 87 observations
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